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“SHOW ME THE MONEY”: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION TO 
CHANGE THE LANDSCAPE OF SPORTS LAW FOREVER 
 
Hannah Harris† 
 
ABSTRACT 
On any given day, the Supreme Court can change the landscape of any 
aspect of the law. On May 14, 2018, the area of sports law was changed forever. 
After a long history of banning sports betting at the state level by the federal 
government, the Supreme Court struck down the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA) based on the anti-commandeering 
principles from prior case precedent. PASPA mandated that state legislatures 
outlaw sports betting in all states not grandfathered into the legislation. The 
Court found that the federal government had no authority to require states to 
ban sports betting. State legislatures are now free to establish their own sports 
betting schemes. Many states have already put a plan into motion to capitalize 
on establishing such schemes. What does this mean for the future of sports 
betting in America? What does it mean for the future of sports in America? 
There are many positives in allowing states the ability to regulate their own 
lotteries. Potential increases in state revenue could provide more money for 
public schools, which are currently largely underfunded. Better schools lead to 
a better quality of life. The interest in sports could also increase. Putting money 
on certain outcomes in a game would allow for increased interest and 
viewership. State-sponsored sports lotteries could add to the fan experience. It 
gives fans a sense of personal connection to the game and the players. 
Additionally, there is no longer the incentive for professional athletes to 
participate in illegal betting schemes, as they are now compensated generously 
for their role in the entertainment of others. Due to multi-million-dollar 
contracts and endorsement deals, professional athletes no longer have the 
incentive to cooperate with illegal activity to make money on the side. 
 
†   Articles & Book Reviews Editor, Liberty University Law Review, Volume 14; J.D. 
Candidate, 2020, Liberty University School of Law. I would like to dedicate this in memory of 
Lloyd Strickler and Larry Harris. Thank you both for the constant support and instilling a love 
of sports within me. I miss you both more than you will know. Additionally, I dedicate this 
work in honor of my grandparents, parents, aunts, and uncles. Without the village that raised 
me, I would not be where I am today. “For I know the plans I have for you…” Jeremiah 29:11. 
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The Supreme Court reopened the door for states to enact sports betting 
schemes within their economy. For now, because of the newness of the decision, 
we cannot know the full effect, either positive or negative, that the “new” power 
will have on state economies or citizens. However, several hypotheses can be 
drawn. One possible cost of the new decision could be an increase in organized 
crime. While sports betting may become legal in more states, there is still the 
possibility that some gamblers may take the new freedom too far and venture 
into the illegal sports betting that brought the need for the legislation in the first 
place. Opening the door for sports gambling may allow them to kick down the 
door and go back to square one in terms of fraud, game fixing, and 
embezzlement. As many young people are interested in sports, there is likely to 
be an increase in gambling addictions in teens and young adults. Teens and 
young adults are at risk of developing a life-altering disease that could 
perpetually affect the rest of their lives. Finally, while professional athletes are 
unlikely to get caught up in illegal gambling schemes, amateur athletes—
namely college athletes—are more vulnerable given the restrictions that the 
NCAA and other amateur sports leagues put on them. Without compensation, 
this group of athletes could succumb to the pressures of outside influences and 
make decisions that could taint the landscape of sports. 
Sports law changed forever in 2018, but was it for the better or for the worse? 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “Sports teaches you character, it teaches you to play by the rules, it teaches 
you to know what it feels like to win and lose—it teaches you about life.”1 
Americans love sports. Americans believe in the pureness of sports. 
Americans use sports as an escape from the routine rat race of their daily 
lives. In 1992, Congress, fed up with the scandals involving the intermingling 
of organized crime and fraud in sports, enacted the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (PASPA).2 Congress used this act to uphold the 
integrity of the sports in which citizens of the United States of America were 
losing faith.3 This act, also known as the Bradley Act, was challenged by the 
State of New Jersey in NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey (Christie I) as a 
 
1.   Billie Jean King Quotes, BRAINY QUOTE, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/billie_je
an_king_364072 (last visited Mar. 5, 2020). 
2.   Professional and Amateur Sports and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, § 2(a), 106 
Stat. 4227 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (1992)), invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
3.   138 CONG. REC. 12,971–72 (1992). 
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violation of the “anti-commandeering” doctrine set forth in Printz v. United 
States and New York v. United States.4 Anti-commandeering is a 
constitutional principle in which statutes and legislation are struck down if 
they coerce, compel, or require a state or state officials to carry out federal 
regulatory schemes.5 New Jersey made the anti-commandeering challenge 
after the state was sued by multiple sports organizations for attempting to 
change its gambling scheme.6  
 In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found 
that PASPA did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine and upheld the 
statute.7 Although New Jersey amended its statute, it was sued again in  
Murphy v. NCAA.8 To understand how the Supreme Court changed the 
landscape of sports law, it is important to understand why Congress passed 
the legislation, what the legislation said, how the Court came to hear the case, 
and what doctrine the Court used to decide the case. In Murphy, the Supreme 
Court used constitutional principles to change the landscape of sports law 
forever. Additionally, this article hypothesizes potential effects, both positive 
and negative, that the Court’s decision could have on sports law and the 
sports industry, as we do not know the full effects this “new” power will have 
on state economies and citizens. 
II. WHY DID CONGRESS DECIDE TO PASS THE PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR 
SPORTS PROTECTION ACT? 
A. Point-Shaving and Game Fixing Scandals 
Congress enacted PASPA in reaction to the long history of scandals in 
sports. Most of these scandals involved either “point-shaving,” where 
compromised players helped the team win but made sure that the team 
“fail[ed] to cover the point spread,”9 or “game fixing,” where compromised 
players worked to ensure a team lost. Starting with the Chicago “Black” Sox 
in 1919, several scandals occurring throughout history are prime examples of 
what Congress was trying to prevent by enacting PASPA in 1992.  
 
4.   See NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey (Christie I), 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2013).  
5.   Id. at 227.  
6.   Id. at 214.  
7.   Id. at 240. 
8.   Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1472 (2018). 
9.   Ray Gustini, How Point Shaving Works, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/04/how-point-shaving-
works/349575/.  
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1. 1919 and the Chicago “Black” Sox 
 One of the biggest scandals to ever strike baseball, and the world of sports 
in general, occurred during the 1919 World Series when the Cincinnati Reds 
played the Chicago White Sox.10 Allegedly, prior to the start of the World 
Series, the first baseman of the White Sox met with known gambler Joseph 
“Sport” Sullivan.11 This conversation involved discussing the possibility of 
the White Sox losing the World Series in return for payment to the players 
who helped make sure this happened.12 C. Arnold “Chick” Gandil, the first 
baseman, confessed to agreeing to fix the World Series for a payment of 
$100,000.13 Gandil drafted other players to help achieve the task: pitchers 
Eddie Cicotte and Claude “Lefty” Williams, shortstop Charles “Swede” 
Risberg, and outfielder Oscar “Happy” Felsch.14 Later, they drew in Fred 
McMullin and star hitter “Shoeless” Joe Jackson.15  
 The White Sox lost game one of the World Series 9-1; a loss of which the 
New York Times said, “[n]ever before in the history of America’s biggest 
baseball spectacle has a pennant-winning club received such a disastrous 
drubbing in an opening game.”16 The next game ended with a White Sox loss, 
when pitcher Lefty Williams “gifted the Reds” the game by walking three 
batters.17 By game six, the Reds were up in the series by four games to one.18 
However, by this time the compromised players were “grow[ing] restless” 
because they were not being paid the installments that were allegedly  agreed 
upon.19 Unsatisfied with the individuals who were supposed to be giving 
them money for losing games, the players agreed to start playing and actually 
try to win the series.20 The White Sox won games six and seven as a result.21 
 
10.   Evan Andrews, The Black Sox Baseball Scandal, HIST.: HIST. STORIES (Oct. 9, 2014), 
https://www.history.com/news/the-black-sox-baseball-scandal-95-years-ago. 
11.   Id. 
12.   Id. 
13.   Id. 
14.   Id. 
15.   Id. 
16.   Andrews, supra note 10. 
17.   Id.  
18.   Id. 
19.   Id. 
20.   Id. 
21.   Id. 
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However, the White Sox lost game eight 10–5, “giving [the] Cincinnati [Red 
Sox] their first ever World Series win.”22  
 Following the World Series, rumblings became louder about possible 
conspiracies to fix the Series, but nothing was truly examined until August of 
1920, when evidence of gamblers working to fix a regular season game came 
to light.23 In front of a grand jury investigating the World Series, Eddie 
Cicotte admitted, “I don’t know why I did it . . . I needed the money. I had 
the wife and kids.”24 Two other individuals also confessed.25 “Shoeless” Joe 
Jackson admitted to accepting $5,000 for his part in the scandal.26 The grand 
jury indicted Gandil, Cicotte, Williams, Risberg, Felsch, McMullian, Weaver, 
and Jackson—known collectively as the Black Sox—on charges of 
conspiracy.27 However, because the paper records of the players’ confessions 
went missing (many believe the White Sox owner and a gambling kingpin 
arranged for the papers to be stolen), the jury returned a verdict of not guilty 
and the Black Sox went legally unscathed.28 The courts were unable to hold 
these players accountable for their role in the game fixing.  
 The baseball world did not treat these Black Sox players so leniently. The 
eight players were banned from baseball for life without the possibility of ever 
being reinstated.29 This action by the Commission “helped cleanse baseball’s 
damaged image,” but also “[swept] the Black Sox scandal under the rug.”30  
2. College Basketball in 1951 
 The year 1951 brought major scandal to college basketball.31 After City 
College of New York (CCNY) pulled off an unexpected championship 
victory in the NCAA tournament, the public discovered that it was all a 
sham.32 The New York District Attorney “arrested 32 players from seven 
colleges” for “fix[ing] 86 games between 1947 and 1950.”33 The schools 
 
22.   Andrews, supra note 10. 
23.   Id. 
24.   Id. (omission in original). 
25.   Id.  
26.   Id. 
27.   Id. 
28.   Andrews, supra note 10. 
29.   Id. 
30.   Id. 
31.   Joe Goldstein, Explosion: 1951 Scandals Threaten College Hoops, ESPN CLASSIC (Nov. 
19, 2003), https://www.espn.com/classic/s/basketball_scandals_explosion.html. 
32.   Id. 
33.   Id.  
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affected were CCNY, Long Island University (LIU), Bradley University, New 
York University (NYU), University of Kentucky, Manhattan College, and 
Toledo University.34 Authorities discovered systemic point-shaving 
throughout the entire United States in a plot involving mobsters, gamblers, 
bribers, and conspirators.35 
 The CCNY players at the center of the scandal were charged with “illegal 
point spread manipulation.”36 Three players on the varsity basketball team 
were arrested after returning from a game in Philadelphia.37 The authorities 
in New York uncovered a conspiracy between mobster Salvatore Sollazzo and 
several players: freshmen Ed Roman, Eddie Warner, and Al Roth.38 After 
further investigation, four other CCNY players, Irwin Dambrot, Herb 
Cohen, Norm Mager, and Floyd Layne, were arrested.39 
 Investigation discovered that Sollazzo started the scheme in the summer 
when he started offering players $1,000–$1,500 per fixed game in a summer 
league.40 This agreement leaked into the regular season once the summer 
leagues were over, giving mobsters a new opportunity to make cash: point-
shaving.41 Now, the players were only asked to ensure they won “by a certain 
number of points,” not to make sure their team lost.42 This was a very 
attractive offer for players from low-income families.43 However, most of the 
players actually returned most of the money they received as compensation 
for their part in the deal when cooperating with officials, as many had not 
spent much of it.44  
 Five players received suspended sentences, but Roth and Warner received 
active sentences.45 Roth made a deal with the judge, and, in return for joining 
 
34.   Id.  
35.   See generally id.  
36.   Marvin Kalb, The College Basketball Victory That Seemed Too Good to Be True—and 
Was, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/04/the-college-basketball-victory-
that-seemed-too-good-to-be-true-and-was/275263/. 
37.   Id. 
38.   Id.  
39.   Id. 
40.   Id. 
41.   Id.  
42.   Kalb, supra note 36. 
43.   Id.  
44.   Id. 
45.   Id. 
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the U.S. Army, his sentence was dropped.46 Warner went to jail for six 
months, making him the only CCNY player to see the inside of a jail cell.47 
The NBA also banned the seven players from ever joining the professional 
league.48  
3. Pete Rose’s Lifetime Ban from Baseball and the Baseball Hall 
of Fame 
 Pete Rose is synonymous with sports gambling. He played and managed 
for the Cincinnati Reds in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.49 Rose still holds the 
record for most hits in a career at 4,256.50 In 1988, Rose’s extracurricular 
activities became national news when Major League Baseball alleged that he 
was betting on baseball games as the manager of the Reds during the 1986 
season.51 Giamatti, the commissioner of baseball at the time, investigated 
Rose for violation of Rule 21 of Major League Baseball, which forbids a 
player, or anyone employed by a major league baseball team, to bet on any 
major league baseball game.52 This rule is on display in all major league 
clubhouses around the league, and violation of the rule has a very harsh 
result: a lifetime ban from baseball.53  
 After an investigation by appointed special counsel John Dowd, it became 
clear that Rose was involved in betting on major league baseball games, even 
games that he was managing.54 Rose filed suit against the Commissioner of 
Baseball and the Major League.55 However, Rose withdrew the suit after he 
made a deal with Commissioner Giamatti.56 In return for dropping the suit 
 
46.   Id. 
47.   Id. 
48.   Kalb, supra note 36. 
49.   See Pete Rose Managerial Record, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-
reference.com/managers/rosepe01.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2019); Pete Rose Stats, BASEBALL 
REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/r/rosepe01.shtml (last visited Sept. 
21, 2019). 
50.   Banning of Pete Rose, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-
reference.com/bullpen/Banning_of_Pete_Rose (last updated Dec. 16, 2017).  
51.   Id. 
52.   Id.  
53.   Id. 
54.   Id. 
55.   Id.  
56.   Banning of Pete Rose, supra note 50. 
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and no finding of guilt, the Commissioner of Baseball banned Rose for life 
with the ability to ask for reinstatement in the future.57  
 In 1991, Pete Rose became eligible to be included on the Hall of Fame 
ballot.58 As the all-time hits leader, Rose’s history-making career as a player 
made him a prime candidate for the Hall of Fame.59 However, given his 
lifetime ban from Major League Baseball, Rose’s name would always be 
associated with the ban. The Hall of Fame, an entity separate from Major 
League Baseball, decided that Rose would also be banned from “appearing on 
the ballot since he was on [Major League Baseball’s] ineligible list.”60 It also 
stated that its decision could change should Rose ever be reinstated into 
Major League Baseball prior to December 2005.61 After 2005, Rose would “no 
longer be eligible to be voted in[to]” the Hall of Fame.62 Rose is still banned 
from Major League Baseball and the Hall of Fame even after applying for 
reinstatement into both entities: Major League Baseball in 2015 and the Hall 
of Fame in 2016.63  
B. Legislative History 
On June 2, 1992, the Senate considered Senate Bill 474—what would 
become PASPA—which had sixty-two cosponsors at the time.64 Senators 
DeConcini, Hatch, and Bradley spoke in favor of the bill, while Senator 
Grassley spoke against the bill as it stood, offering an amendment expanding 
the states’ rights on this issue.65 The senators who spoke in favor of the bill 
cited two main reasons why the legislation was needed to prohibit sports 
gambling: protection of the integrity of sports and the need to prevent the 
spread of gambling addiction in young adults.66 The senator who offered the 
amendment stated that the amendment was necessary to allow states an 
 
57.   Id. 
58.   David Hill, Cincinnati Reds History: Pete Rose Banned from Hall of Fame Ballot, FOX 
SPORTS (June 30, 2017, 10:28 PM), https://www.foxsports.com/mlb/story/cincinnati-reds-
history-pete-rose-banned-from-hall-of-fame-ballot-020417.  
59.   Id. 
60.   Id. 
61.   Id. 
62.   Id. 
63.   Id.; Why Rob Manfred Denied Pete Rose from Reinstatement, USA TODAY (Dec. 14, 
2015, 1:14 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2015/12/14/press-release-
commissioners-decision-regarding-pete-roses-application-reinstatement/77297114/.  
64.   138 CONG. REC. 12,972 (1992). 
65.   See generally id. at 12,960–78. 
66.   E.g., id. at 12,972. 
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opportunity to decide for themselves if they wanted sports betting before 
Congress decided for them.67 It is important to take each senator’s argument 
in turn, because it shows the development of the debate on the floor of the 
Senate. Understanding each argument illustrates how this debate shaped the 
legislation that was signed into law. 
 The first senator to speak was Senator DeConcini from Arizona. He 
started by explaining the “public purpose” of the bill, saying that the bill 
would “stop the spread of State-sponsored sports gambling and maintain the 
integrity of sports in America, [the] national pastime.”68 Senator DeConcini 
went further to say that sports betting “threatens to change the nature of 
sporting events” and “threatens to undermine public confidence in the 
integrity of professional and amateur sports.”69 He also discussed the threat 
that sports betting poses to the vulnerable population of teenagers who are 
naturally enticed by it, noting that of the “8 million compulsive gamblers in 
America, 1 million of them are under the age of 20.”70 The senator from 
Arizona also introduced testimony by the executive director of the National 
Center of Pathological Gambling, who stated that “sports are uniquely 
attractive to young people” and “sports lotter[ies] not only teach[] youngsters 
how to bet on sports, but . . . also encourage them to bet on sports.”71 
 Senator DeConcini went on to explain the need for legislation on the issue 
of sports betting. He started by explaining that, while sports lotteries may 
seem to be an attractive revenue source, lotteries of this kind are “not the 
answer, no matter how noble the cause.”72 He stated that legalizing sports 
betting could actually increase the spread of illegal sports betting: “legalized 
gambling broadens its appeal and teaches you how to bet. . . . [and t]hen you 
look to bookies for credit, better odds and no taxes on winnings.”73 Senator 
DeConcini then addressed the contention raised by the opponents of the 
legislation that state-sponsored sports lotteries involved the raising of state 
revenue and therefore were within the state’s rights to choose.74 The senator 
rebutted this position by saying that sports betting “is not a benign revenue 
source;” rather, “[i]t tarnishes sports contests” and “diminishes the function 
 
67.   Id. at 12,975. 
68.   Id. at 12,972. 
69.   Id. 
70.   138 CONG. REC. 12,972 (1992). 
71.   Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
72.   Id. 
73.   Id. at 12,972–73. 
74.   Id. at 12,973. 
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of athletes as role models for young people.”75 He further stated that sports 
have an “interstate nature,” and, therefore, legislation of this kind was 
something Congress could pass.76  
 The senator from Arizona ended by discussing the exempted states and 
lands that would fall under the bill. He stated that Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, 
and Montana all had sports betting schemes that would be allowed to 
continue under the bill, but would not be allowed to expand.77 DeConcini 
stated that the grandfathering provision only “allows those States that have 
sports gambling authorized by State law to continue to do what they are 
doing now or could do under State law.”78 This meant that states falling under 
the exemptions could not expand or venture into other forms of sports 
betting not already in place. 
 Next, Senator Hatch from Utah spoke in support of the bill. He started by 
discussing how utilizing sports betting as a source of revenue can be 
destructive. He stated that “sports gambling [did] not produce the long-term 
stable source of revenue” that proponents believed it did.79 He further said 
that the “only real winners” in state-sanctioned sports betting “would be the 
bookies and the private companies that encourage” such schemes.80 Senator 
Hatch then discussed the ramifications that state-sponsored sports betting 
would have on the integrity of professional and amateur sporting events. He 
stated that these schemes would “erode[] the good will in the service marks 
of the teams” and “send[] the wrong message to [the] Nation’s youth.”81  
 The senator from Utah discussed testimony presented in committee by the 
Commissioner of the National Football League. Commissioner Paul 
Tagliabue gave “four basic reasons to oppose the spread of legalized sports 
gambling.”82 His third reason was most notable:  
“[L]egalized sports gambling sends a terrible message to 
youth.” Perceptions of athletes are diminished in young 
minds if they are reduced in stature by being participants, 
however unwilling, in gambling schemes. State-sponsored 
 
75.   Id. 
76.   138 CONG. REC. 12,973 (1992). 
77.   Id. 
78.   Id. 
79.   Id. 
80.   Id. 
81.   Id. 
82.   138 CONG. REC. 12,973–74 (1992). 
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sports gambling sends a message to our young people that 
raising revenue is more important than moral standards.83 
Next, Senator Hatch moved to discuss the addiction concerns that state-
sponsored sports betting would likely increase. He stated that these schemes 
would “lead to a further increase in teenage gambling because our young 
people are attracted to sports activities.”84 Senator Hatch concluded by 
mentioning that this is an important bill that “almost everybody who is 
anybody in sports wants . . . [this bill] to pass.”85 
 Next to speak was Senator Grassley from Iowa. While Senator Grassley 
agreed with the ills of sports betting, he disagreed with the substance of 
PASPA.86 He contended that the bill, as it stood, discriminated against states 
that did not already have sports betting schemes and did not allow the states 
without present schemes to enact their own legislation.87 Senator Grassley 
proposed an amendment that stated as follows: “The provisions of [the Act] 
shall not apply to any [sports betting] scheme in a State which, prior to 
January 1, 1985, enacts legislation stating that such State desires to be exempt 
from such prohibition.”88 Grassley explained that this amendment would 
allow for a “reasonable opportunity” for states to “declare . . . they do not 
want to be covered by this bill’s reach.”89 Senator Grassley then discussed the 
validity of the “grandfather clause” and how the Supreme Court historically 
disfavored such clauses.90 He cited Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, a 1936 
decision, in which the Court held that the grandfather clause at issue was an 
“arbitrary and discriminatory violation of the Constitution” and struck down 
a statute “which only permitted milk producers which had been in business 
before a specified date to avoid the statute’s pricing restrictions.”91 Grassley 
stated that the Court in Mayflower Farms found that the pricing law was “[a]n 
attempt to give economic advantage to those in a given business at an 
arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date.”92 
The decision in Mayflower Farms, like the grandfather clause proposed in 
 
83.   Id. at 12,974. 
84.   Id. 
85.   Id. 
86.   Id. 
87.   Id. 
88.   138 CONG. REC. 12,974 (1992). 
89.   Id. 
90.   Id. at 12,975. 
91.   Id.; see also Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 274 (1936). 
92.   138 CONG. REC. 12,975 (1992); see also Mayflower Farms, 297 U.S. at 274. 
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PASPA, gave the same economic advantage effect: the states already in on 
sports betting would have an economic advantage over the states that could 
not pursue such schemes after the legislation was enacted.93 
 The senator from Iowa went on to discuss how this law would not “outlaw 
gambling on sports events.”94 He stated that the bill would not change the 
practices of office pools on football and NCAA basketball, which can be 
considered common street gambling.95 He asserted that because professional 
athletes sign “multi-year, multi-million-dollar contract[s],” the risk of 
professional athletes tampering with state-regulated sports [was] very low.96  
 Grassley then moved on to his last point concerning the Indian Gaming 
Regulations Act.97 Senator Grassley explained that if Congress passed the bill 
without his amendment, Congress would infringe on the right of Indian 
tribes to gamble on Indian lands.98 This is because Indian lands allowed for 
“certain forms of gambling . . . not prohibited by Federal law” on Indian 
lands and PASPA would prohibit sports betting.99  
 After the three senators said their piece about the bill, it was time for 
rebuttal. Senator Hatch was first, and he directly responded to Senator 
Grassley’s amendment to the bill and advocated for the bill as it stood.100 He 
stated that the amendment “create[d] a window . . . in which any State or all 
of the 46 States may enact legislation which would exempt the particular State 
or those States from the prohibitions of this bill.”101 Senator Hatch went on 
to say that the bill was a “compromise” for the states exempted, and 
“[c]ompromise [was] frequently necessary” in Congress.102 He then discussed 
how the amendment would be counterintuitive to the purpose of the bill, 
which was to protect the integrity of sports and protect young adults who are 
likely to succumb to the dangers of sports betting.103 He stated that the 
legislation as it stood before the amendment was the best Congress could do, 
 
93.   138 CONG. REC. 12,975 (1992). 
94.   Id. 
95.   Id. 
96.   Id. 
97.   Id. 
98.   Id.  
99.   138 CONG. REC. 12,976 (1992). 
100.   Id.  
101.   Id. 
102.   Id. 
103.   Id. 
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   18 5/14/20   9:43 AM
2020]                            “SHOW ME THE MONEY”                             459 
 
  
and it was “a heck of a good job.”104 Senator Hatch concluded by saying 
“apply[ing] this to 46 states and circumscrib[ing]” the other four ensured the 
goals of the proposed legislation.105 This meant that the compromise of 46 
out of 50 states being regulated on this issue would satisfy the purpose of the 
regulation: curbing sports betting. 
 Senator DeConcini took the floor next to rebut Senator Grassley’s 
amendment. He began by saying that the amendment was “completely 
inconsistent with the goal of the legislation and would set a very bad 
precedent in the Congress. States should not be given the choice about 
whether or not they want to be covered by the law.”106 The senator from 
Arizona went on to explain that the bill, as it stood, might exempt certain 
states but did not allow for the statutes in those states to be expanded or for 
the state to explore sports betting ventures different from their current 
scheme.107 Senator DeConcini said that this was not a states’ rights issue, as 
sports are a “national pastime, not just confined in the geographic area of one 
state.”108 
 The final words of Senator Grassley on the matter were very much in line 
with his original argument as to why the amendment was necessary. He 
added that the supporters of the bill had already allowed for one state, New 
Jersey, “to have a window of opportunity” that Grassley believed should be 
given to every State if it were given to one.109 He stated that New Jersey did 
not have a sports betting bill but Congress gave them the opportunity to enact 
one. Senator Grassley posed a question in his final thoughts: “[I]f we are 
going to give New Jersey an opportunity through the crime bill to pass such 
legislation—why can’t we allow 45 other States the same opportunity?”110 
 Senator DeConcini responded to Senator Grassley by saying the allowance 
for New Jersey to enact the sports betting scheme would require a 
constitutional amendment within a year and the legislation referred to by 
Senator Grassley was different from the legislation debated at the time.111 He 
made the distinction between the House crime bill on sports betting, which 
extended the grandfather clause to New Jersey, and the legislation before the 
 
104.   Id. 
105.   138 CONG. REC. 12,976 (1992). 
106.   Id.  
107.   Id. at 12,977. 
108.   Id. 
109.   Id. 
110.   Id. at 12,977–78. 
111.   138 CONG. REC. 12,977-78 (1992). 
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Senate in the debate they were having at the moment.112 He went on to say 
that while there would never be a way to stop sports betting, Congress could 
do everything in its power to stop it.113 He concluded by mentioning that 
while it may not have been “fair” to exempt some states in the Act and not 
others, the states that were exempt from the legislation relied so heavily on 
gambling that something had to give way to help the overall cause.114 
 The final senator to speak was Senator Bradley from New Jersey. As one 
of the major proponents of the legislation, he stated that the amendment was 
not in line with the purpose of the legislation.115 He argued that the “dangers 
are of national importance” and that Congress should not adopt the 
amendment.116 All in all, the amendment was rejected and the bill moved on 
to the House.117  
III. WHAT DID THE PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT 
SAY? 
 Fed up with the public’s growing disdain towards the national pastime, 
Congress decided to act to combat sports betting because Americans had 
begun to lose faith in sports.118 The Senate enacted the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) on October 28, 1992.119  
A. The Substance of the Act 
 At its core, PASPA was an act “to prohibit sports gambling under State 
law, and to achieve purposes.”120 Under § 3702, the act made it unlawful for 
any state, except those within the grandfather clause, to “sponsor, operate, 
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact” any form of 
gambling in which “amateur or professional athletes participate, or are 
intended to participate.”121 PASPA also made it unlawful for any “person to 
sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” such sports betting schemes under 
 
112.   138 CONG. REC. 12,978 (1992).  
113.   Id.  
114.   Id. 
115.   Id. 
116.   Id. 
117.   Id. 
118.   138 CONG. REC. 12,972 (1992). 
119.   Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
559, 106 Stat. 4227, (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (1992)) invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
120.   Id. 
121.   Id. at § 3702(1). 
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§ 3702(2).122 Violation of this statute allowed a professional or amateur sports 
organization to bring a civil action against the state government to enjoin the 
state’s betting scheme when the organization’s “competitive game [was] 
alleged to be the basis of such violation.”123  
 The statute set out exceptions for those state entities which already had a 
sports betting scheme in place. The exceptions allowed any sports betting 
schemes that were in effect before PASPA was enacted to remain.124 Further, 
the Act added an exemption for Indian lands regulated under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act.125 
B. Grandfather Clause and Exempted Sports 
 After passing in the House and the Senate, the bill went to the President 
for approval. Signed by President George H. W. Bush, the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 became law on October 28, 1992.126 
The Act’s final language created a grandfather clause for four states: Nevada, 
Oregon, Montana, and Delaware, as discussed in the debates.127 These states 
were allowed to keep their present sports betting schemes but were not 
allowed to expand upon the current scheme or venture into other schemes.128 
“For example, Nevada could not conduct a sports lottery, and Oregon could 
not introduce other forms of sports betting.”129 The Act’s language provided 
that if the scheme was “conducted by that State or other governmental entity 
at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 
31, 1990,” then the Act did not apply.130  
 
122.   Id. at § 3702(2). 
123.   Id. at § 3703. 
124.   Id. at § 3704(a). 
125.   Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
559 § 3704(b), 106 Stat. 4227, 4228, (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (1992)) invalidated by 
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); see also Indian Gaming Regulation Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(4) (2019). 
126.   Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
559, 106 Stat. 4227, (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (1992)) invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
127.   138 CONG. REC. 12,972, 78 (1992).  
128.   Id. 
129.   Id. 
130.   Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
559, 106 Stat. 4227, (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (1992)) invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
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 This legislation affected New Jersey as well. The provision created for New 
Jersey allowed the state to create a sports betting scheme in Atlantic City, a 
municipality that already allowed for casinos.131 The provision creating this 
opportunity stated as follows: 
 (3) a betting, gambling or wagering scheme, other than a 
lottery described in paragraph (1), conducted exclusively in 
casinos located in a municipality, but only to the extent 
that— 
(A) such scheme or a similar scheme was 
authorized, not later than one year after the effective 
date of this chapter, to be operated in that 
municipality; and  
(B) any commercial casino gaming scheme was in 
operation in such municipality throughout the 10-
year period ending on such effective date pursuant 
to a comprehensive system of State regulation 
authorized by that State’s constitution and 
applicable solely to such municipality.132 
IV. HOW DID MURPHY V. NCAA GET TO THE SUPREME COURT? 
 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court applied the 
anti-commandeering principles to a challenge by the state of New Jersey.133 
While ultimately striking down PASPA in 2018, there were many challenges 
New Jersey’s actions asserting its right to enact sports betting legislation 
outside of the scope of PASPA.134 
 
 
 
 
 
131.   138 CONG. REC. 12,977 (1992). 
132.   Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
559, 106 Stat. 4227, 4228 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (1992)) invalidated by Murphy v. 
NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
133.   NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 227–28 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Christie I). 
134.   NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 394 (3rd Cir. 2015) (Christie II). 
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A. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) v. Christie 
(Christie I) 
 In Christie I, PASPA had a provision that allowed New Jersey one year to 
amend its constitution to allow for sports betting within the state.135 New 
Jersey did not take advantage of this time period, and it did not try to legalize 
sports betting until 2010.136 Through an amendment to its state constitution, 
New Jersey tried to “authorize by law wagering . . . on the results of any 
professional, college, or amateur sport or athletic event.”137 After enacting 
legislation pursuant to the amendment, New Jersey was sued by all of the 
major sports associations, including the NCAA, MLB, NFL, and NHL, who 
sought to enjoin the New Jersey law as a violation of PASPA.138  
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit first held that PASPA was 
constitutional as “accepting New Jersey’s arguments . . . would 
require . . . several extraordinary steps . . . making it harder for Congress to 
enact laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”139 The court also invalidated 
the law that New Jersey was trying to pass in violation of PASPA.140 After 
finding that the sports associations had proper standing to sue,141 the court 
moved on to analyze PASPA and New Jersey law on the merits.142 It started 
by asking whether or not Congress had the proper authority to enact the 
legislation under its Commerce Clause powers.143 Finding that “wagering and 
national sports are economic activities,” that “professional and amateur 
sporting events . . . ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce,” and that 
“placing wagers on sporting events also substantially affects interstate 
commerce,” the court of appeals established that PASPA was a valid exercise 
of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.144 The court also found that 
 
135.   Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
559, 106 Stat. 4227, 4228 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (1992)) invalidated by Murphy v. 
NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
136.   Christie I, 730 F.3d at 217. 
137.   Id. (quoting N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, para. 2 (D)(F)). 
138.   Id. 
139.   Id. at 215. 
140.   Id. 
141.   Id. at 223–24. 
142.   Christie I, 730 F.3d at 224. 
143.   Id.  
144.   Id. at 224–25. 
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wagering at the intrastate level could affect commerce at an interstate level; 
therefore, Congress had “a rational basis” to enact this legislation.145  
 The Third Circuit next discussed “[w]hether PASPA [i]mpermissibly 
[c]ommandeers the [s]tates.”146 First, the appellate court found that the act 
contains “classic preemption language that operates . . . to invalidate state 
laws that are contrary to the federal statute.”147 This means that the law that 
was properly enacted is supreme to all state laws that conflict with PASPA. 
Because the New Jersey law does “precisely what PASPA says the states may 
not do,” the New Jersey law was invalid.148  
 The court of appeals also examined prior precedent looking at the 
Supremacy Clause, the anti-commandeering principle, and the regulation of 
state conduct.149 The court held that while the cases dealing with the 
Supremacy Clause “involve[] Congress attempting to directly impose a 
federal scheme on state officials,” PASPA did not.150 The court reasoned that 
PASPA was not commandeering, or barring, states “from doing something 
they want to do.”151 Turning to New York and Printz, the court of appeals 
quickly distinguished the legislation at issue in New York and Printz from 
PASPA, because the laws in New York and Printz were affirmative commands 
for the states to act, and PASPA was not.152 The court decided that PASPA 
did not commandeer the states because the states did not have to lift a finger 
to help the federal government; as such it was a very different situation from 
New York and Printz. PASPA is a “blanket ban,” not a coercive or compelling 
requirement to fulfill the federal government’s wishes.153 The court also 
found that PASPA was “remarkably similar” to other statutes that were 
upheld against commandeering challenges.154 
 Finally, the court looked at “[w]hether PASPA violate[d] the [e]qual 
[s]overeignty of the [s]tates.”155 First, the court stated that the legislation, in 
this case, was “fundamentally different” than the legislation examined by 
 
145.   Id. at 226. 
146.   Id.  
147.   Id.  
148.   Christie I, 730 F.3d at 227. 
149.   Id. at 229–34; see infra Section V. 
150.   Christie I, 730 F.3d at 229–30.  
151.   Id. at 230. 
152.   Id. at 231. 
153.   Id. at 233. 
154.   Id. at 234. 
155.   Id. at 237. 
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other cases because the legislation was not of the “same nature” as the other 
cases.156 Second, while New Jersey “would have [them] hold that laws treating 
states differently can ‘only’ survive if they are meant to ‘remedy local evils,’” 
this is an “overly broad” and a “one-size-fits-all test” that the court declined 
to establish.157 Third, the court yet again distinguished this case from former 
precedent dealing with the application of the equal sovereignty principle.158 
Fourth, the court stated the true purpose of PASPA was to stop expansion of 
sports wagering, making it “irrational” to find that the states that already had 
a system in place had to get rid of their scheme.159 Finally, the court held that 
a “complete invalidation” would do “far more violence to the statute.”160 
According to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, given the former 
precedents, PASPA did not violate any of the established constitutional 
principles.161  
B. Court of Appeals Decision in Murphy v. NCAA 
After Christie I in 2013, New Jersey tried again to establish a sports betting 
scheme in an attempt to circumvent the decision of the Third Circuit.162 The 
New Jersey legislature passed a bill which stated that “[a]ny rules . . . that may 
require or authorize any [s]tate agency to license, authorize, [or] 
permit . . . any person to engage in the placement or acceptance of any wager 
on [sporting events] . . . are repealed . . . .”163 The legislation restricted the age 
of those who could participate in sports betting, and it forbade betting on 
sporting events that involved New Jersey college teams or any event taking 
place in New Jersey.164 Once again, almost all sporting agencies sued New 
Jersey under PASPA.165 The district court held that “PASPA offer[ed] two 
choices to states: maintaining prohibitions on sports gambling or completely 
repealing them.”166 New Jersey appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that 
the new law was not “in violation of PASPA and . . . [was] consistent with 
 
156.   Christie I, 730 F.3d at 238. 
157.   Id. 
158.   Id. at 239. 
159.   Id. 
160.   Id. 
161.   Id. at 240. 
162.   NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 394 (3d Cir. 2016) (Christie II). See N.J. Stat. 
§ 5:12A-7 (New Jersey’s enacted legislation at the center of this case has been repealed). 
163.   Id. 
164.   Id. 
165.   Id. at 394. 
166.   Id. at 394–95.  
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Christie I,” while “the Leagues” argued that the “[l]aw violate[d] PASPA 
because it ‘authorizes by law’ sports wagering and . . . impermissibly 
‘licenses’ the activity.”167 
The Third Circuit conducted two separate analyses to conclude that the 
district court was correct in their decision: (1) the 2014 law violated 
PASPA,168 and (2) “PASPA [d]oes [n]ot [i]mpermissibly [c]ommandeer the 
[s]tates.”169 At the outset, the court concluded that the 2014 law violated 
PASPA for several reasons. First, contrary to PASPA, the legislation 
“authorize[d] casinos and racetracks to operate sports gambling.”170 The 
court noted that the repeal of certain former prohibitions allowed for the 
authorization.171 It found that New Jersey’s legislation was an authorization 
disguised as a repeal.172 Second, the legislation was not a complete repeal of 
the prior prohibition because it specifically carved out certain allowances for 
sports betting.173 The law worked to establish who, what, when, and where 
sports betting could happen, specifically authorizing certain actions through 
a repeal.174 Finally, the state of New Jersey had the option to establish its own 
scheme through PASPA, but it did not take the opportunity when given.175 
The court found that the law New Jersey tried to pass in 2014 was exactly the 
same as what New Jersey could have done in 1992 had its citizens decided 
that sports betting should be allowed.176 Consequently, the court reasoned 
that “[i]f Congress had not perceived that sports gambling in New Jersey’s 
casinos would violate PASPA, then it would not have needed to insert the 
New Jersey exception.”177  
 After holding that the law violated PASPA, the court moved on to PASPA 
itself to determine whether the law was unconstitutional. Using the basic 
structure of Christie I, the Third Circuit held true to the idea that PASPA was 
constitutionally sound for several reasons. First, there was no command for 
 
167.   Id. at 395. 
168.   Christie II, 832 F.3d at 396. 
169.   Id. at 398. 
170.   Id. at 396. 
171.   Id.  
172.   Id. at 397. 
173.   Id. at 396. 
174.   Christie II, 832 F.3d at 396.  
175.   Id. at 397. 
176.   Id. 
177.   Id.  
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   26 5/14/20   9:43 AM
2020]                            “SHOW ME THE MONEY”                             467 
 
  
the states to do anything.178 There were no affirmative actions for the states 
to take as a result of PASPA.179 There was no “coercive” choice for the states 
to make.180 There was no requirement that the state take any sort of action 
under PASPA.181 There were no directives under PASPA towards states or 
state officials.182 The only thing that a state had to do under PASPA was sit 
on the legislation and do nothing to tip the scales toward authorizing sports 
betting.183 The court stated, “a state’s decision to selectively remove a 
prohibition . . . in a manner that permissively channels wagering activity to 
locations or operators is . . . ‘authorization’ under PASPA.”184 Because of this, 
the court found for the Leagues, which set the stage for Murphy v. NCAA.185 
V. WHAT DOCTRINE DID THE COURT USE TO STRIKE DOWN PASPA? 
 The following two cases were instrumental in the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Murphy v. NCAA. Before these cases, the principle of “anti-
commandeering” was an implied concept and not written in stone. The 
following cases were used by the Court to analyze the problem presented by 
PASPA. 
A. New York v. United States 
In New York v. United States, one of the leading cases on the anti-
commandeering doctrine, Justice O’Connor wrote that “while Congress has 
substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States . . . , the 
Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the 
States. . . .”186 The Court in New York v. United States invalidated one of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act’s three provisions as 
inconsistent “with the Constitution’s allocation of power to the Federal 
Government.”187 
At the time of New York v. United States, there was a lot of low-level 
radioactive waste in the United States.188 At the time of the decision, only 
 
178.   Id. at 401. 
179.   Id.  
180.   Christie II, 832 F.3d at 401.  
181.   Id. at 402. 
182.   Id. 
183.   Id. 
184.   Id. at 401. 
185.   Id. 
186.   New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
187.   Id. 
188.   Id. 
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three sites in the continental United States had provided for the disposal of 
such waste since 1979: one site in Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina 
respectively.189 The rest of the country shipped its waste to those states to be 
properly disposed of.190 After Nevada and Washington shut down their 
disposal sites, South Carolina’s governor “ordered a 50% reduction in the 
quantity of waste accepted” at South Carolina’s disposal site.191 Congress 
responded to this reduction by enacting the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Act in 1980.192 This act made each state responsible for the “disposal 
of the low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders” and allowed 
states to enter into “regional compacts” in order to “restrict the use of their 
disposal facilities to waste generated within member States” by 1986.193 By 
1985, there were only three congressionally-approved regional compacts, 
which were around the states with pre-Act disposal sites.194 Because the other 
thirty-one states not in a compact would not have the ability to dispose of 
their low-level radioactive waste properly, Congress enacted the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which was later 
challenged by the state of New York.195 
The amendments extended the amount of time the sites would accept 
waste from non-compact states for an additional seven years and allowed for 
those states to charge for such receipt of waste.196 “Encourag[ing] the States 
to comply with their statutory obligation to provide for the disposal of waste 
generated within their borders,” the Act established three incentives: (1) 
monetary incentives, (2) access incentives, and (3) the take title provision.197 
These incentives were the main focus of litigation in the case.198  
The monetary incentive provided that twenty-five percent of “surcharges 
collected by the sited States must be transferred to . . . the Secretary of 
Energy” and each state, by complying with several deadlines, could receive 
portions of the money received by the Secretary of Energy.199 States that did 
 
189.   Id. at 150. 
190.   Id.  
191.   Id.  
192.   New York, 505 U.S. at 150–51. 
193.   Id.  
194.   Id. at 151. 
195.   Id. 
196.   Id. at 151–52. 
197.   Id. at 152–53. 
198.   New York, 505 U.S. at 154. 
199.   Id. at 152–53. 
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not meet the deadlines by 1993 would either have to take title to the waste 
generated in their state or forfeit the surcharge money.200 Access incentives 
provided that the states that did not meet deadlines set forth in the monetary 
incentive could be subject to higher surcharges by states with disposal sites 
and denied access to the sites after a certain period of time.201 Each of the 
deadlines, provided in the monetary incentives, held different levels of 
increased surcharges and different periods of time after which the state could 
restrict access to the disposal sites.202 Finally, the “take title provision” stated 
that if a state could not provide for the disposal of the low-level radioactive 
waste, then the state would take responsibility for the waste and be liable for 
any damages “directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or owner” as 
a result of “the failure of the State to take possession of the waste soon after 
January 1996.”203 
New York failed to join a regional compact but enacted “legislation 
providing for the siting and financing of a disposal facility.”204 The residents 
of the counties where the site could have gone opposed the legislation.205 The 
state filed suit against the United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act violated the Tenth 
and Eleventh Amendments, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
and the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution.206 
Answering the ultimate question of “whether any of the three challenged 
provisions of the . . . Act . . . oversteps the boundary between federal and state 
authority,”207 the Court held that the “take title provision” was the only 
incentive of the Act that was unconstitutional and upheld the rest of the 
statutory scheme.208 Because “[s]tates are not mere political subdivisions of 
the United States,” and the governments of states are not agents of the federal 
government, Congress may not “compel the [s]tates to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program.”209 In other words, the federal government could 
 
200.   Id. at 153. 
201.   Id. 
202.   Id.  
203.   Id. at 153–54. 
204.   New York, 505 U.S. at 154. 
205.   Id. 
206.   Id.; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.; U.S. CONST. amend. X.; U.S. 
CONST. amend. XI. 
207.   New York, 505 U.S. at 159. 
208.   Id. at 183–84. 
209.   Id. at 188. 
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   29 5/14/20   9:43 AM
470 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2 
 
  
not require the state to take title to the radioactive waste in question. 
Constitutionally, Congress may preempt state regulations and provide 
incentives for the state legislatures to enact certain statutory regulations, but 
Congress may not direct states to enact such regulations.210 The Court also 
found that neither the monetary incentives nor the access incentives violated 
the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution, as these incentives had nothing to 
do with the change of the republican form of government within the state.211 
Finally, the Court found that the third incentive was severable from the 
others; therefore, the structure and purpose of the Act could be fulfilled even 
with the removal of the invalid measure.212 
 The Court presented a historical record which established two very 
important principles: (1) Congress may attach conditions to federal money 
under its spending power that are reasonably related to “the purpose of the 
federal spending,”213 and (2) Congress may provide states with a choice 
between regulating an activity that Congress may regulate under the 
Commerce Clause or allowing for the federal law to be preempt state law.214 
Congress cannot “require the states to regulate.”215 The Act did not clearly 
commandeer the states, as it did not upset the constitutional balance of state 
and federal governments and rules of statutory construction; thus, each of 
the incentives had to be reasoned separately to determine the 
constitutionality. 
 The Court upheld the first incentive as a valid exercise of Congress’s 
authority to encourage the “[s]tates to regulate according to the federal 
plan.”216 The incentive involved three steps, and the Constitution permitted 
each step. The first step, the allowance of states to surcharge those states not 
within their compact, was constitutional because states have the ability to 
burden interstate commerce with Congress’s approval.217 The second step, 
the collection of surcharges by the Secretary of Energy, was “no more than a 
federal tax on interstate commerce,” allowable under Congress’s power to 
tax.218 Finally, the third step of the first incentive, the Secretary’s distribution 
 
210.   Id.  
211.   Id. at 185. 
212.   Id. at 187. 
213.   New York, 505 U.S. at 167. 
214.   Id. 
215.   Id. at 177; see also id. at 188. 
216.   Id. at 173. 
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342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   30 5/14/20   9:43 AM
2020]                            “SHOW ME THE MONEY”                             471 
 
  
of money to those states that complied with the Act, was a valid “conditional 
exercise of Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause [to place 
conditions] on the receipt of federal funds.”219 
 The Court also upheld the second incentive as a valid “conditional exercise 
of Congress’[s] commerce power.”220 Because states must “regulate the 
disposal . . . according to federal standards” or “their residents . . . will be 
subject to federal regulation,”221 the incentive does not require states to enact 
legislation, thereby violating the Constitution. A state does not have to 
expend monies on programs that their citizens deem unworthy, “[n]or must 
the State abandon the field if it does not accede to federal direction.”222 A state 
may regulate “in any manner its citizens see fit.”223 
 In contrast, the Court deemed the third “incentive” to be a compulsion, 
not a choice.224 Since the third incentive provided that the state either 
“accept[] ownership . . . or regulate[] according to the instructions of 
Congress,” the instruction passed the line of “encouragement” to 
“coercion.”225 According to the Court, “the Act commandeers the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program.”226 Because states did not have a choice in the 
matter under the third incentive, the Court held the act to be 
unconstitutional.227 The Court further stated—in response to the argument 
by the United States that the state consented to the expansion of federal 
powers—that states cannot consent to the expansion of the federal 
government’s power.228 The Constitution’s federal structure was not 
established to protect the state governments from the federal government, 
but to protect the individual citizens of the states from their state and federal 
governments.229 Even if the state officials consented to the mandate of the 
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220.   Id. at 174. 
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224.   Id. at 174–75. 
225.   New York, 505 U.S. at 175.  
226.   Id. at 176 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 288 
(1981)). 
227.   New York, 505 U.S. at 177.  
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federal government, unconstitutional mandates would still be impermissible 
under the structure of the Constitution.230  
 In deciding that the third incentive was unconstitutional, the Court set out 
several guiding principles to apply to future cases dealing with the anti-
commandeering doctrine. First, Congress must regulate permissible objects 
directly and avoid using state governments and officials as its agents.231 
Further, while federal law is enforceable in state courts and federal courts 
have the power to order states to comply, Congress has no authority to 
mandate state regulations and legislation.232 Finally, as mentioned above, 
state officials and governments can never consent to the unconstitutional 
expansion of Congress’s power.233 
B. Printz v. United States 
 In 1997, the Court took another look at, and expanded, the anti-
commandeering doctrine. Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968.234 
This act “establish[ed] a detailed federal scheme governing the distribution 
of firearms.”235 Congress enacted this law in order to “prohibit[] firearms 
dealers from transferring handguns to any person under 21, not resident in 
the dealer’s State, or prohibited by state or local law from purchasing or 
possessing firearms.”236 Basically, Congress tried to use this legislation to 
restrict people from having access to guns.  
 By 1993, Congress amended the Gun Control Act (GCA) by “enacting the 
Brady Act.”237 The Brady Act changed how the GCA was enforced. Congress 
required the “Attorney General to establish a national instant background 
check system by . . . 1998.”238 The federal system provided that before a 
transfer of a handgun, a seller must (1) “receive from transferee a statement” 
pursuant to the Brady Act; (2) “verify the identity of the [buyer] by examining 
an identification document;” and (3) “provide the ‘chief law enforcement 
officer’ (CLEO) of the [buyer’s] residence with notice of the contents.”239 The 
 
230.   Id. 
231.   Id. at 178. 
232.   Id. at 179. 
233.   New York, 505 U.S. at 182. 
234.   Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997). 
235.   Id. 
236.   Id. 
237.   Id. 
238.   Id. 
239.   Id. at 902–03. 
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Act gave states two different alternatives to the federal scheme set out by the 
Brady Act: “[a] dealer may sell a handgun immediately if the purchaser 
possesses a state handgun permit . . . or if state law provides for an instant 
background check.”240  
 If states had not enacted one of the alternatives, the CLEOs had to take 
certain steps.241 After receiving the notice, the CLEO had five days to use 
“reasonable effort” to ensure that the sale of the gun did not go to someone 
who would violate the law if they possessed a handgun.242 After checking into 
the sale, the CLEO did not have any obligation to notify the seller if the sale 
would be unlawful, but the CLEO could notify the seller of the illegal sale and 
provide a written statement to the purchaser.243 If the CLEO did not find any 
information that the seller should be notified of, then the CLEO “must 
destroy any records in his possession relating to the transfer.”244 The Act 
required that the state “enlist[] . . . state executive officers for the 
administration of federal programs.”245 Petitioners, designated CLEOs, took 
issue with this and sued to test the constitutionality of the Act.246 
The case made it to the United States Supreme Court after the district 
court found that “the provision requiring CLEOs to perform background 
checks was unconstitutional, but concluded that the provision was 
severable.”247  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.248 Writing 
for the majority, the late Justice Scalia charged that it was “apparent that the 
Brady Act purports to direct state law enforcement officers to 
participate . . . in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory 
scheme.”249 Justice Scalia used a historical analysis,250 a constitutional 
analysis,251 and prior jurisprudence analysis252 to conclude that the law 
 
240.   Printz, 521 U.S. at 903. 
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242.   Id. 
243.   Id. 
244.   Id. at 903–04. 
245.   Id. at 905. 
246.   Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.  
247.   Id.  
248.   Id. 
249.   Id.  
250.   See id. at 905–918. 
251.   See id. at 918–925. 
252.   See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925–933. 
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violated the anti-commandeering principle established in New York v. United 
States.253  
Starting with the historical analysis, Justice Scalia looked at several laws 
established by the first Congresses.254 These laws dealt with citizenship and 
naturalization.255 States were a part of making sure that every person in the 
new United States was recorded and had citizenship.256 Other statutes during 
that time required state courts to oversee certain cases designated to them.257 
Justice Scalia said that there was a difference between those statutes and the 
one at issue in Printz: the “early statutes” did not give Congress the power to 
“impress the state executive into its service.”258 The government also brought 
the Extradition Act of 1793 to the attention of the court.259 This federal act 
“required the ‘executive authority’ of a State to . . . arrest and 
deliver[] . . . fugitive[s] . . . upon the request of the executive authority of the 
State from which the fugitive had fled.”260 Justice Scalia found that this was 
an exercise of the Extradition Clause of the U.S. Constitution and had 
nothing to do with commandeering the states.261  
Justice Scalia also examined the Federalist Papers and found that “none of 
[the Federalist Papers examined] necessarily impl[y] . . . that Congress could 
impose [duties on states] without the consent of the States.”262 Justice Scalia 
mentioned that the Federalist Papers show that the states had the ability to 
help the federal government with their programs but did not mention that 
“they had a responsibility to execute federal laws.”263 Finally, Justice Scalia 
noted that the prior immigration policies and selective service regulations, 
unlike the legislation under review in Printz, did not compel the states to do 
anything.264 
Next, Justice Scalia looked at the structure of the Constitution and the 
principles of dual sovereignty and separation of powers. The Constitution 
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established two separate sovereigns in the United States: the federal 
government and the individual state governments.265 The federal government 
received certain powers and responsibilities for itself, and then the rest were 
kept by the states.266 Justice Scalia said that the “separation of the two spheres 
is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty,” while another 
is the separation of powers between the three branches of government.267 
Looking at the separation of powers, “[t]he Brady Act effectively 
transfers . . . responsibility to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 states,” which 
was an impermissible transfer of power.268 Congress has no ability to 
“regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce,” which is 
exactly what the Brady Act did.269 
Finally, the prior precedents of EPA v. Brown, Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining, and FERC v. Mississippi that were used in New York v. United States, 
showed that the “Federal Government . . . may not compel the States to enact 
or administer a federal regulatory program.”270 Justice Scalia reasoned that 
this is exactly what the Brady Act did.271 Because the Brady Act required state 
executives to carry out the federal program at their cost, the Brady Act “runs 
afoul of [the] rule” that the federal government may not compel the states to 
carry out its programs.272 
VI. HOW DID THE SUPREME COURT DECIDE MURPHY V. NCAA? 
A. Background and Facts 
 Justice Alito opened the opinion of the Court by discussing America’s 
inconsistent beliefs about gambling.273 Then, he focused on New Jersey’s 
gambling history.274 Starting in 1897, New Jersey enacted a “constitutional 
amendment that barred all gambling in the [s]tate.”275 During the Great 
Depression, New Jersey loosened the ban allowing for “parimutuel betting on 
 
265.   Id. at 918. 
266.   Id. at 918–19. 
267.   Id. at 921. 
268.   Id. at 922–23. 
269.   Id. at 924. 
270.   Printz, 521 U.S. at 926 (quoting New York v. United States., 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)). 
271.   Id. at 935. 
272.   Id. at 933. 
273.   Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1468–69 (2018). 
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horse races.”276 One reason for this was to “increas[e] state revenue.”277 The 
state further loosened the ban in 1953, when “churches and other nonprofit 
organizations” began “host[ing] bingo games.”278 Finally, “[i]n 1970, New 
Jersey became the third state to run a state lottery.”279  
 Next, the Court discussed gambling in Atlantic City.280 Atlantic City used 
gambling to “revitalize” its failing economy in the 1960s.281 In 1976, after 
failing to pass “a referendum on statewide” gambling, “voters approved a 
narrower measure allowing casino gambling in Atlantic City alone.”282 This 
allowed for Atlantic City to have “an east coast monopoly,” as Nevada was 
the only other state to allow casino gambling.283 When the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act of 1988 was enacted, the monopoly shrunk.284 As more 
casinos opened on reservations, fewer people went to Atlantic City and opted 
for closer casinos.285  
 Moving to sports betting, the opinion discussed the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) and the legislative history behind 
the decision to enact PASPA.286 The Court discussed the “most important 
provision” of PASPA: the provision dealing with the unlawfulness of state-
sponsored sports betting.287 The Court also noted that PASPA did not make 
sports betting a federal crime, but allowed for the “Attorney General, as well 
as professional and amateur sports organizations, to bring civil actions to 
enjoin violations.”288 The Court moved on to the New Jersey-specific 
provision, as discussed above, and mentioned that New Jersey never took 
advantage of the time given to implement its own sports betting scheme.289 
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286.   Id. at 1469–70. 
287.   Id. at 1470; see also Professional and Amateur Sports Protection (PASPA) Act, Pub. 
L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4227, 4228 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (1992)), invalidated by 
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
288.   Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470–71. 
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B. Procedural History  
 New Jersey tried again to allow sports betting in 2014, after failing in 
Christie I.290 The court of appeals decided the act “selectively remove[s] a 
prohibition on sports wagering in a manner that permissively channels 
wagering activity to particular locations or operators.”291 The court of appeals 
then looked to whether PASPA violated the constitutional principle of anti-
commandeering.292 The Third Circuit held that it did not as PASPA did “not 
command states to take affirmative actions.”293 
C. Issues on Appeal 
 The Court found that the question presented was “whether this provision 
is compatible with the system of ‘dual sovereignty’ embodied in the 
Constitution.”294 In order to determine this, the Court bifurcated the 
question by examining first the meaning of the provision, which “prohibit[s] 
[s]tates from ‘author[izing]’ sports gambling,” and second, the 
constitutionality of the provision.295  
D. What is the Meaning of the Provision?  
1. Plaintiff’s Arguments 
   The plaintiffs in this case, the sports organizations, argued the legislation 
“empower[ed] a defined group of entities, and . . . endow[ed] them with the 
authority to conduct sports gambling operations.”296 Since this was the partial 
repeal of the ban on sports betting, the plaintiffs argued that the legislation 
ran afoul of PASPA which meant that PASPA would preempt the 
legislation.297 The United States submitted an amicus brief in support of the 
plaintiffs.298 It made an argument similar to the plaintiffs’ argument, stating 
that the meaning of the New Jersey legislation was that “selective and 
conditional permission to engage in conduct that is generally prohibited 
 
290.   Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1472; see also supra Section IV.A. 
291.   Id. (quoting NCAA v. Governor of N.J. (Christie I), 832 F.3d 389, 397, 401 (3rd Cir. 
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292.   Id. at 1472–73. 
293.   Id. at 1473 (quoting Christie I, 832 F.3d at 401).  
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certainly qualifies as an authorization.”299 The United States also argued that 
it was “implausible” that “Congress commanded every county, district, and 
municipality in the Nation to prohibit sports betting.”300 The defendant, the 
state of New Jersey, argued that the “anti-authorization provision requires 
States to maintain their existing laws against sports gambling without 
alteration.”301 Since one definition of “authorize” is to “permit,” the 
defendants stated that “any state law that has the effect of permitting sports 
gambling . . . amounts to an authorization.”302 
2. Holding and Rationale 
 The Court agreed with the plaintiffs’ definition of the provision.303 “When 
a State completely or partially repeals old laws banning sports gambling, it 
‘authorize[s]’ that activity.”304 Because of the “state-law landscape at the time 
of PASPA’s enactment . . . . the competing definitions offered by the parties 
lead to the same conclusion” that any change in the sports betting legislation 
of a state “permits” and “empowers” individuals to gamble on sporting 
events.305 The Court further stated that the United States’ argument, 
regarding the command of Congress, “again ignor[ed] the legal landscape at 
the time of PASPA’s enactment.”306 Sports betting was “generally prohibited 
by state law,” but the state could allow for the subdivisions of the state to 
make their own decisions about sports betting; therefore, a ban on the local 
level was necessary to complete the intent of the legislation.307 
E. Is PASPA Constitutional? 
 Moving on, the Court addressed the legislation’s constitutionality. 
Outlining the principles of the anti-commandeering doctrine,308 the Court 
held that “even if the law could be interpreted” in favor of the sports 
organizations and the United States, “it would still violate the [anti-
commandeering] principle.”309 The Court outlined three reasons why the 
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anti-commandeering principle is important.310 First, the principle “serves as 
one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.”311 Second, the 
principle “promotes political accountability.”312 Finally, the principle 
“prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the [s]tates.”313 
These policies helped the Court decide to strike down PASPA and return 
power to the states.  
1. Plaintiff’s Arguments 
 Plaintiffs argued that PASPA did not tell the states what to do, like Printz 
and New York.314 Plaintiffs also argued that “commandeering occurs ‘only 
when Congress goes beyond precluding state action and affirmatively 
commands it.’”315 Another argument brought forth was that, given other case 
law decisions, PASPA’s “anti-authorization provision [was] 
constitutional.”316 Finally, plaintiffs attempted to argue that PASPA was a 
valid preemption provision.317  
2. Holding and Rationale 
 PASPA violated the anti-commandeering principle because it 
“unequivocally” told the states what they could and could not do.318 Congress, 
through PASPA, “issue[d] direct orders” to the states, which told them that 
they could not have legislation that allowed for sports betting on the books.319 
“A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.”320 The 
Court stated that “[i]t [was] as if federal officers were installed in state 
legislative chambers” to stop proposals on sports betting.321 The Court held 
that this was something that Congress could not do without offending the 
traditional notions of federalism.322  Moving on to the plaintiffs’ next 
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argument, the Court examined four prior Court decisions dealing with anti-
commandeering, upon which the plaintiffs relied, and distinguished them all 
from the current case.323 Concluding that “none of the prior 
decisions . . . involved federal laws that commandeered the state legislative 
process” or “directed . . . [s]tates either to enact or to refrain from enacting a 
regulation,” the Court held that its precedent did not “support[] the 
constitutionality of . . . PASPA.”324 Finally, the Court addressed the plaintiffs’ 
preemption argument. After explaining the three types of preemption, the 
Court held that none of the preemption principles applied.325 Because the law 
neither gave individuals any “federal rights” nor “impose[d] any federal 
restrictions,” the “provision . . . [was] not a preemption provision.”326 
Rejecting all of the plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court held that the provision 
preventing states from authorizing sports betting was unconstitutional.327 
F. Is the Anti-Authorization Provision “Severable” from PASPA? 
 After striking down the provision, the Court then moved to decide if there 
were any way for the rest of the legislation to be upheld without it.328 This is 
called severability: when the law “remains ‘fully operative’ without the invalid 
provisions,” then the law can stand.329 If not, then the Court must invalidate 
the entire scheme.330 Because the only provision left would be the prohibition 
on state-operated sports betting, the question became “[i]f Congress had 
known that [s]tates would be free to authorize sports gambling in privately 
owned casinos, would it have nevertheless wanted to prevent [s]tates from 
running sports lotteries?”331 The Court found that the answer was no because 
“[t]o the Congress that adopted PASPA, legalizing sports gambling in 
privately owned casinos while prohibiting state-run sports lotteries would 
have seemed exactly backwards.”332 Had Congress put the scheme into place 
without the anti-authorization provision, the act would have been “sharply 
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different” than the scheme “contemplated” by Congress in 1992.333 Each of 
the provisions in PASPA would not be the same without the anti-
authorization provision; therefore, the unconstitutional provision could not 
be severed from the rest of the provisions and still hold the integrity of the 
statute.334 
G. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
 There were two opinions given by separate justices apart from the 
majority. First, Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, and Justice 
Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Breyer in part, dissented 
from the majority’s opinion.  
1. Justice Thomas’ Concurrence 
 Justice Thomas wrote to explain his “growing discomfort with [the] 
modern severability precedents.”335 Agreeing that PASPA went beyond 
Congress’ authority, Justice Thomas focused mainly on the severability 
analysis.336 Severability, according to Justice Thomas, exceeds “traditional 
limits on judicial authority,” and there is no history within the Court to 
suggest that severability is a judicial decision that needs to be made.337 He 
argued that the court is not in the business of rewriting statutes for Congress, 
and a decision that one provision is unconstitutional should be the end of the 
discussion.338  
2. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg wrote about the “wrecking ball” that came 
through “destroying [PASPA]” and ripping it from the books.339 She stated 
the first two provisions—those banning the states from operating sports 
betting and preventing private parties from establishing their own sports 
betting schemes—were “salvage[able],” given Congress’ authority to regulate 
sports betting, and the other regulation to stop the spread of sports betting 
could still be accomplished.340 
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VII. WHAT EFFECTS COULD MURPHY V. NCAA HAVE ON SPORTS LAW? 
 In the aftermath of Murphy, the fifty state legislatures across the nation are 
free to enact sports betting schemes in whatever ways they deem proper. 
What does this mean? How will this affect the landscape of sports, commerce, 
crime, and even people? While the U.S. has yet to feel the full effects of this 
landmark sports law decision, a few positive and negative hypotheses may be 
opined.  
A. What Positive Effects Could the Decision Have? 
1. Likely Increase of State Revenue  
 Many states, like Virginia, already have a lottery in place. The Virginia 
Lottery prides itself on being self-operated and giving back to schools.341 
According to the Virginia Lottery website, “approximately $1.6 million” is 
raised every day for public K–12 schools.342 Since 1999, the Virginia Lottery 
has raised over $9 billion in profits for public schools.343 This was done with 
the current scheme alone. Imagine the amount of revenue to be raised by 
adding sports betting to the already expansive list of lottery possibilities in 
every state. 
 Delaware has already begun to see how sports betting can increase the 
state’s revenue. In June of 2018, the Delaware legislature enacted the first 
legislation, “offer[ing] single-game sports wagering outside Nevada.”344 
Between June and October 2018, the three casinos in the state generated 
$39.77 million in wagers, with $27.9 million raised at Delaware Park.345 Of 
that, the state “netted almost $5.2 million” in approximately four months.346 
This means that almost one million dollars a month goes back into the state 
to help fund social programs, public schools, highway construction, and 
more. Delaware’s preliminary model helps to show how many states could 
raise revenue through instituting new sports betting schemes. 
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2. Likely Increased Fan Experience and Increased Revenue for 
Sports Organizations 
 According to a 2018 Seton Hall University Sports Poll, Americans are 70% 
“more likely to watch a sports event they have placed a bet on.”347 Betting 
gives sports fans a stake in the outcome, making the fans more interested in 
the players on the field. This is good for sports organizations, like the NFL 
and MLB, that are, ironically, heavily opposed to legalizing sports betting in 
the states. As the number of viewers increases, organizations can charge more 
for advertising, and organizations can earn more money from a single event. 
Betting also creates loyalty to players, teams, and certain sports. Many fantasy 
football participants choose players based on the team the players are on. 
Someone with that player on their “fantasy team” will watch the player and 
follow the team’s success during that season. Should the fantasy participant 
develop loyalties to that player or team, it creates a recurrent viewership for 
the sport. It is all connected and intertwined. Revenue for sports teams and 
organizations is dependent upon fan experience. Since sports betting is likely 
to increase fan experience and loyalties, sports teams and organizations are 
sure to benefit.  
3. Unlikely to Affect Professional Athletes  
 Donald Cressey, a student of Edwin Sutherland, developed a theory on 
fraud in 1951 called the “Fraud Triangle.”348 In his article Why Do Trusted 
Persons Commit Fraud? A Social-Psychological Study of Defalcators, Cressey 
identified three conditions that must be present to commit embezzlement: 
(1) “a non-sharable problem,” (2) “an opportunity for trust violation,” and 
(3) “a set of rationalizations that define the behavior as appropriate in a given 
situation.”349 Even though Cressey specifically applied them to 
embezzlement, the theory is applicable to all types of fraud. The non-sharable 
problem is one the individual does not want to share, such as money trouble 
or addictions that need funding. The opportunity must be given to the 
individual to betray the trust of the person or entity who put them in the 
position. Finally, rationalization occurs when the fraudsters come to terms 
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with betraying trust and potentially starting over again or perpetuating the 
fraud further.350   
 How does this work in the context of sports and gambling? Quite simply, 
players in professional sports are governed by rules that are put in place to 
protect the integrity of a sport. Like the laws that govern white-collar crime, 
players are not to break the rules. If they do, there are consequences. This 
puts them in a position of trust with the sports organizations—players are 
trusted to play the game in a way that is fair.  
Unlike the Chicago “Black” Sox and Pete Rose, professional players of 
today—not just in baseball, but all professional sports—are at a lower risk of 
betraying the trust of their league for a simple reason: money.351 It is well 
known that professional athletes, formerly vulnerable to gambling, receive 
proper compensation for their playing, not just on the field but also off. 
Between multi-million-dollar contracts with large signing bonuses and 
endorsement deals with national corporations, the landscape of money in 
sports today is very different than it used to be. The access to contracts and 
endorsements removes one of the prongs in the fraud triangle, “the non-
sharable problem.” Not every problem deals with money, however. After all, 
sometimes, a person can have all the money in the world and still be addicted 
to gambling. But, because of the millions of dollars available to professional 
players for their participation in sports, this group of athletes is less 
vulnerable to the temptation to “defraud” the fans by choosing to participate 
in the newly legalized sports betting. The ability to make money elsewhere 
prevents the need to “get in on the action” as the Black Sox did in 1919. Those 
Chicago baseball players did not have access to the resources that 
professional athletes do today. 
B. What Negative Effects Could the Decision Have? 
1. Increase in Gambling Addiction 
 Congress feared that the nation’s young people would succumb to the 
dangers that gambling brought with it, most notably, addiction.352 With the 
states able to permit sports betting within their borders, there are new 
opportunities for gamblers of all ages who have not previously been exposed 
to gambling in this capacity. Buying lottery tickets at a convenience store is 
very different from being able to bet and become a part of something bigger 
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than a scratch-off ticket. Young adults are the most vulnerable demographic 
to succumb to the dangers of sports betting and gambling in general.353 In 
2000, “evidence indicat[ed] that between 4 and 8% of adolescents have a very 
serious gambling problem, while another 10–15% are at-risk.”354 Congress 
worried about the adolescents being affected by sports betting when it 
enacted PASPA; its worries may be realized with PASPA being removed from 
the law.  
2. Increase in Organized Crime 
 One of the many types of illegal activity that organized crime cells engage 
in is gambling.355 While the states may now implement their own schemes of 
sports betting, that does not reduce the risk of organized crime and illegal 
gambling. All over the world, sports betting “developed enclaves 
combining . . . open gambling with lavish entertainment.”356 These locations 
were “very beneficial to modern organized crime” as money began to pour 
into the organized crime cells.357 Not only was their money funneling in 
through their operation, but open gambling provided a way to cycle the 
illegal money through and “clean it.”358 While there is the potential for new 
state schemes to compete with the underground cells, adaptation is not hard. 
Creating a way to overcome the new schemes may prove to be less difficult 
than the states would hope. People using money laundering techniques create 
the risk of fraud: having a legitimate, legal business funded by illegal activity 
which “cleans” the money.359 Online gambling and the ability to shuffle 
money via the internet can also play a factor in the adaptation of organized 
crime to newly legalized gambling in the states.360 
3. Likely to Affect Collegiate Athletes 
 As mentioned above, the fraud triangle theory does not apply to 
professional athletes, given the means by which the athletes are adequately 
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compensated. This is very different for college athletes because colleges do 
not pay their athletes for their participation at the collegiate level. Athletes 
can lose their eligibility to play if they do not follow the proper rules and 
procedures of the NCAA.361 If an athlete gets paid, it moves him or her from 
amateur status to professional status. Athletes cannot play under the NCAA 
as professionals; they must maintain their amateur status.362 Given the 
massive amount of revenue being brought in by collegiate athletics in the 
United States, many college athletes feel as if their colleges owe something 
other than their educational benefits and other distributed “stipends.” 
 In comes the fraud triangle. Where professional athletes do not have the 
“non-sharable problems,” college athletes do. They are aware of the money 
brought to the schools because of their arduous work. They see it all around 
them in locker rooms, equipment, and facilities. It brings a sense of 
resentment towards the institution because they are not reaping the instant 
benefits of their labors. Getting a quality education and possibly working 
towards professional end goals do not show up as quickly as a new car, pair 
of shoes, or headphones. College athletes would be given the opportunity to 
make money through gambling and take bribes from outside sources. 
Eighteen to twenty-one-year-old athletes have the motive to do so, and they 
can rationalize their decisions by choosing to believe that taking bribes or 
participating in state gambling is the proper compensation that they deserve 
for their efforts on the court, field, or pitch. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, the Supreme Court changed the landscape of sports, 
gambling, and state sovereignty through its decision in Murphy v. NCAA. By 
striking down the decades-long ban on sports betting, the Court has opened 
the doors for states to take their own stab at regulating sports betting for the 
good of the state. But at what cost? At what cost does raising revenue come 
when discussing the integrity of the sports we know and love? Only time will 
tell where or how far the states will take this “new” power. 
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